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The initial impetus for this special issue was a landmark 
article by Happé and Ronald (2008; see also Happé et al., 
2006), in which it was claimed that, contrary to widespread 
belief, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is not a coherent 
syndrome in the classical sense. Instead, it was hypothe-
sised that the behavioural deficits in social interaction, 
communication and behavioural flexibility (restricted and 
repetitive behaviour and interests) that were diagnostic of 
ASD in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders–Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000) are separa-
ble, with each feature having independent psychological/
cognitive, neurobiological and genetic bases. As such, 
these features can occur separately, but only when they co-
occur can the ASD be diagnosed. Of course, this view is 
somewhat at odds with the new diagnostic framework laid 
down in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders–Fifth Edition (DSM-5; APA, 2013), which char-
acterises ASD in terms of a dyad (rather than triad) of 
behavioural deficits in social-communication and behav-
ioural flexibility. The collapsing of social interaction defi-
cits and communication deficits is not in accord with the 
view that these behavioural features are separable, although 
it does not rule out the possibility that they have distinct 
underlying causes.
One reason why the idea of a fractionable triad was 
potentially revelatory was because it provided a new and 
possibly more tractable way to approach the understanding 
of the causes, as well as the management, of ASD. Despite 
almost half a century of research into all aspects of ASD, 
there are still no reliable diagnostic biomarkers for ASD, 
and nor do we know enough about how to remediate the 
core features of the disorder either through medication (see 
Blankenship et al., 2011), as Rutter notes in his commen-
tary, or through behavioural interventions (e.g. Green et al., 
2010). If Happé and Ronald’s (2008) hypothesis is correct, 
then research (and intervention efforts) should be directed 
towards understanding each component feature of ASD in 
isolation, rather than ASD as a whole.
What, then, do the articles in the special issue contribute 
to this debate? Since ASD is currently a behaviourally 
defined condition, a good place to start this debate is to 
establish the relative coherence of the different diagnostic 
features of the disorder. The articles by Mandy et al. and 
Frazier et al. broadly support the structure proposed by 
DSM-5 by finding that a two-factor solution fitted the data 
that they obtained using the Developmental, Dimensional 
and Diagnostic Interview (3di; Skuse et al., 2004), and the 
Social Responsiveness Scale-2 (SRS; Constantino and 
Gruber, 2012), respectively. Particularly reassuring was 
that Mandy et al. found this two-factor solution in both UK 
and Finnish sample of individuals with ASD, suggesting 
cross-country/cross-cultural reliability in the structure of 
core ASD features. Both these sets of findings can be con-
sidered congruent with some notion of fractionation among 
the features of ASD, in that neither Frazier et al.’s study or 
Mandy et al.’s study found that a one-factor model ade-
quately fitted their data. However, it is striking that in both 
studies, the two factors were associated significantly. In 
Frazier et al.’s study, the associations between SRS scores 
in social-communication domain and SRS scores in the 
repetitive and restricted behaviour domain were remarka-
bly high, ranging from .87 to .95 in their ASD sample, child 
general population sample and adult general population 
sample. Although the SRS is somewhat weighted more 
towards measuring social-communication features than 
repetitive and stereotyped behaviour (in that the latter 
aspect of the dyad is assessed by only a small proportion of 
the 65 items that comprise the SRS), it is striking that the 
association between the two aspects of the dyad is so strong 
in each of these samples. The sheer size of the samples also 
leaves little room to question the reliability of the findings, 
which is a clear strength of the data reported by Frazier et 
al. In Mandy et al.’s study, the association between the two 
factors was smaller in magnitude, but notably consistent 
across their UK sample (r = .43) and Finnish sample (r = 
.44). These observations raise the question of what should 
count as coherent when considering ASD features? Both 
studies suggest strongly that the two core ASD features are 
potentially separable, but not that they are unconnected.
A further important finding by Mandy et al. is that sub-
clinical manifestations of ASD-like features among indi-
viduals with the ‘broad autism phenotype’ do not possess 
the same structure among a Finnish sample as they do 
among a UK sample. The importance of the broad autism 
phenotype to the debate about whether ASD features cohere 
is that some individuals appear to have significant ASD-
like traits, but only in one domain. This is taken as prima 
facie evidence that the features of ASD are fractionable. 
However, Mandy et al.’s article may suggest that 
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observations of people with ASD may not generalise to 
individuals with the broad autism phenotype, which may 
lead to caution when considering the applicability of the 
broad autism phenotype to the debate about whether ASD 
is fractionable. As Rutter points out in his commentary, a 
definitive answer to these questions must lie outside a con-
sideration of the co-occurrence of behaviours across indi-
viduals, however, important this approach might be.
For the claim that autism is fractionable, it is not enough 
simply to document patterns of behaviour. Two further 
things are needed: first, a conceptual analysis of what 
would count as coherent or fractionable in this context, and 
second, an analysis of data relating to factors thought to 
underlie the behavioural features. The article by Brunsdon 
and Happé addresses these requirements by exploring the 
extent to which the cognitive causes of ASD are fractiona-
ble. The claim that ASD is fractionable would be strength-
ened if it could be demonstrated that the cognitive 
underpinnings of the disorder (a) are independent of each 
other and (b) contribute to independent behavioural fea-
tures of the disorder. If it could be shown that each behav-
ioural feature of ASD had an entirely distinct underlying 
cause, then this would contradict the notion that the two 
features are fundamentally coherent (although there would 
still be scope for the features to share causes at other levels 
of explanation, or share a developmental relation). Based 
on their comprehensive review of the literature, Brunsdon 
and Happé conclude that there is partial evidence to support 
each of these points/considerations. In particular, they 
argue that the evidence points to deficits in theory of mind 
as a contributory cause of social-communication features of 
ASD (but not repetitive and restricted behaviour) and exec-
utive dysfunction (and, to a lesser extent, weak central 
coherence) as a contributory cause of repetitive and 
restricted behaviour (but not social-communication fea-
tures). Potentially, this is highly important, because, among 
other things, it suggests that cognitive-based interventions 
will need to target individual cognitive deficits in combina-
tion if they are to successfully ameliorate all aspects of 
ASD. However, Brunsdon and Happé also highlight some 
contradictory evidence, which reflects the inconsistent pat-
tern of findings in the existing literature. There are two dif-
ficulties, in particular, when trying to interpret these 
findings.
The first potential difficulty is that (as argued by Hobson, 
in his article) only one of the cognitive accounts of ASD 
that Brunsdon and Happé consider – the Theory of Mind 
(ToM) account – is well specified. ‘Executive functioning’ 
is an umbrella term for several (separable, but related) 
functions that are involved in the control of action (e.g. 
Miyake et al., 2000). It is not clear which aspect/component 
of executive functioning is (proposed to be) a unique and 
specific contributory cause of ASD features, nor whether a 
specific profile of executive dysfunction explains features 
of the disorder. Indeed, some investigators question whether 
such broad notions as ‘executive dysfunction’ can ade-
quately explain specific forms of developmental psychopa-
thology, such as ASD (see, for example, Morton, 2004; but 
see Russell, 1996). Similarly, although the construct of 
‘weak central coherence’ is highly useful at a descriptive 
level, it is still not clear what mechanism might underpin a 
pattern of behaviour that confers coherence at levels as dis-
parate as perceptual and conceptual processing. Thus, in 
our view, the notion of weak central coherence as presently 
construed can take us only a limited way forward in our 
understanding of the basis of ASD.
The second, and perhaps more fundamental, difficulty 
comes when trying to distinguish cognitive task perfor-
mance from the cognitive mechanisms that underpin per-
formance. As Brunsdon and Happé rightly point out, 
cognitive tasks are rarely if ever ‘process pure’. This means 
that it is difficult to be certain whether associations (or lack 
thereof) between cognitive task performance and behav-
ioural features result from (a) an underlying association (or 
lack thereof) between the cognitive process of interest (e.g. 
ToM) and behaviour, or from (b) an underlying association 
(or lack thereof) between extraneous, non-specific task pro-
cesses (e.g. verbal intelligence) and behaviour. The same is 
true when considering associations (or lack thereof) 
between performance on two or more tasks that assess dif-
ferent cognitive constructs (e.g. ToM tasks and executive 
functioning tasks). This difficulty is compounded in the 
case of ASD, given that good performance on cognitive 
tasks can be achieved via compensatory mechanisms 
despite limited underlying cognitive competence. One hall-
mark of compensation, unlike cognitive competence, is that 
it will be inconsistent across different situations. Thus, it is 
striking that Brunsdon and Happé found some degree of 
(even if not total) consistency in associations between 
behavioural features of ASD, and performance on a variety 
of tasks that purport to measure ToM, executive function-
ing and central coherence, respectively. This makes it more 
likely (but not definitively the case) that specific cognitive 
deficits in ASD are related to (possibly specific) behav-
ioural features in ASD, which highlight the importance of 
Brunsdon and Happé’s review and of why, more generally, 
we need to study cognition in ASD if we are to fully under-
stand the disorder (Frith, 2012; Morton and Frith, 1995).
The question remains, however, to what extent do these 
findings rule out the possibility that ASD represents a coher-
ent syndrome? In his article, Hobson provides a valuable 
conceptual analysis of what would count as evidence for 
fractionation or coherence, as well as evidence for his con-
viction that ASD can be considered a coherent disorder. As 
part of his conceptual analysis, he questions whether the 
measures that have been used to identify the behavioural 
and genetic structure of ASD are sufficiently sensitive (and 
reliable) to capture the qualities of ASD features – and spe-
cifically ‘ASD-like’ features among individuals from the 
general population. Hobson makes several important points 
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about the data that Happé and Ronald (2008) use to support 
their fractionation account, but his general point is that 
apparent fractionation (or, in fact, coherence) of ASD-like 
features may be an artificial consequence of insensitive 
measures of ASD features, rather than genuine fractiona-
tion. In his commentary, Rutter makes a similar point about 
the sensitivity of measures to the broad autism phenotype. 
As such, this point also has relevance for interpretation of 
the finding of Mandy et al., reported in this issue, that there 
are cross-cultural differences in the coherence/structure of 
ASD/ASD-like features among individuals with the broad 
autism phenotype. It is possible that these findings reflect 
merely an insensitivity of the measure they used to assess 
features (the 3di), rather than any genuine differences in 
coherence of features across cultures. However, some reas-
surance that Mandy et al.’s findings are not merely an arte-
fact of insensitive feature measurement is provided by the 
fact that the 3di is a clinician-administered measure. This 
means that the trained interviewer has the opportunity to 
prompt for relevant information and to interpret the answers 
given by interviewees in relation to the qualities of ASD fea-
tures. Thus, the 3di may be sensitive to the qualities of ASD/
ASD-like features to a degree that questionnaire measures 
are not (although this does not guarantee that the measure is 
sensitive to the qualities of the broad autism phenotype, as 
Rutter notes). In general, though, we believe the challenges 
posed by Hobson (and by Rutter) are not to be taken lightly, 
even if there turns out to be a tractable solution to them.
As part of his argument that ASD is a coherent syn-
drome, Hobson suggests that a cognitive/psychological 
deficit in the ability to ‘identify’ with the bodily expressed 
attitudes of other people represents a final common path-
way to the syndrome of ASD as behaviourally defined. He 
points out that congenitally blind children merit diagnoses 
of ASD at rates far above chance/the population estimate. 
Presumably, ASD among these individuals does not have 
the same genetic (or perhaps neurobiological) cause(s) as it 
does among sighted children who receive a diagnosis. 
Rather, Hobson argues, ASD among congenitally blind and 
sighted children has the same cognitive/psychological 
cause, namely, a reduced ability to identify with others. In 
blind children, this diminution results from ‘non-central’ 
damage to the visual system, which disrupts input to the 
otherwise-intact cognitive/psychological ‘identification’ 
mechanism, whereas in sighted children, it results from 
‘central’ damage to the mechanism itself. Whether or not 
one accepts Hobson’s claim regarding the shared cognitive 
causes of ASD in sighted and blind children, what is clear 
is that ASD features themselves cohere, rather than frac-
tionate, among blind children with a diagnosis. If one 
accepts the reasonably uncontroversial claim that ASD 
among blind children does not have the same aetiology as it 
does in sighted children, then this example strikes a blow to 
the notion that ASD features in sighted children are merely 
a chance co-occurrence.
As readers might expect, the four articles and commen-
tary in this special issue are not going to settle the question 
of whether ASD, as we currently understand it, is a disorder 
that is best conceptualised as a coherent whole or as a co-
occurring set of sub-features. We are encouraged that, as 
the contributions to this special issue highlight, there is 
considerable debate about the answer to this question. What 
has been established is that there is a refreshing reliability 
about the identification and classification of the behav-
ioural features of ASD. This, at least, suggests that indi-
viduals on the spectrum can be reliably differentiated from 
those who are not. Moreover, it points to a certain coher-
ence at least on the behavioural level. Quite where we go 
when we travel beyond the behavioural level is more prob-
lematic and depends in part on an individual scientist’s or 
clinician’s preoccupations and training. In his commentary, 
Rutter quite rightly notes the importance of considering 
issues of genetics, of neurological impairment such as epi-
lepsy, and of treatment studies. We ourselves, as develop-
mental and experimental psychologists, will inevitably be 
drawn to the conceptualisation of underlying cognitive and 
more general psychological mechanisms, as well as their 
operationalisation. The articles in this special issue show 
that there are still important questions to be answered 
regarding the level of analysis we should adopt (genetic, 
neural, psychological or behavioural) when speaking about 
ASD, and particularly whether the categories that are 
meaningful at one level are easily translated to another. A 
syndrome that is coherent at the biological level might be 
radically fractionable at the behavioural level, or vice versa. 
Rutter’s and Hobson’s mention of diabetes is informative 
here. Originally, ‘diabetes’ meant ‘excessive discharge of 
urine’, which together with characteristic excessive thirst, 
forms a reasonably coherent syndrome. However, we now 
know that there are several types of diabetes. Type 1 diabe-
tes results from insulin deficiency consequent on pancreatic 
dysfunction, whereas type 2 diabetes results from insulin 
resistance rather than deficiency. Both produce symptoms 
of excessive urination and increased thirst (and thus make a 
coherent syndrome), but the underlying biochemistry and 
pancreatic pathology differ. A disorder we now know to be 
unrelated to these two – diabetes insipidus – shares the 
same symptoms of increased urination and thirst, but results 
from disordered kidney-related metabolism. Thus, three 
conditions that are coherent at the ‘behavioural’ level (uri-
nation and thirst) require radically different biological 
explanations and interventions.
Finally, there is the issue of development. It is ironic that 
although ASD is universally characterised as developmen-
tal in nature, development has to a large extent been over-
looked in the contributions to this special issue. However, 
as Rutter rightly argues, we must consider development 
seriously, because ASD features may become more or less 
inter-connected over time. Thus, our conclusion about the 
relative fractionation or coherence of the disorder may 
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differ according to when in development we explore the 
issue. Rutter cites Pellicano (2013) as suggesting that ini-
tially fractionated traits might become more coherent with 
development as a consequence of shared contextual effects 
in development. The alternative is also possible, namely, 
that initially coherent, inseparable traits fractionate over 
time. This could occur as a result of compensation in one 
domain (e.g. learning not to engage in stereotypies), but not 
another domain. This would give the superficial impression 
of incoherence of features, despite coherence in their origi-
nal manifestation. The central point is that we should never 
forget that the clinical picture we see among individuals 
with a diagnosis of ASD represents a particular point in an 
atypical developmental trajectory, in which both the clini-
cal features and any putative underlying factors may be in a 
process of change. The challenge to understand how this 
process of change operates will no doubt add an additional 
layer of complexity to the picture, but we have little doubt 
that this layer will be necessary to resolve the debate about 
fractionation/coherence.
All of these considerations matter, because all of 
them impact in one way or another how we envisage our 
scientific and clinical encounters with people on the 
autism spectrum. This will differ depending on whether 
we see all of ASD as a set of manifestations of a single 
or small set of gene or brain dysfunctions, or whether 
we see different observable patterns of behaviour as 
emergent results of the interplay of different psycho-
logical processes. Whether and how we choose to inter-
vene will, of course, depend also on a wider consideration 
of the individuals themselves, their carers, and their 
families. We hope that this special issue serves to 
sharpen our focus on these issues and will contribute to 
the lively ongoing debate about the coherence or other-
wise of ASD.
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